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Infectious diseases are studied to understand their spreading mechanisms, to evaluate
control strategies and to predict the risk and course of future outbreaks. Because people
only interact with a small number of individuals, and because the structure of these inter-
actions matters for spreading processes, the pairwise relationships between individuals in
a population can be usefully represented by a network. Although the underlying processes
of transmission are different, the network approach can be used to study the spread of
pathogens in a contact network or the spread of rumors in an online social network. We
study simulated simple and complex epidemics on synthetic networks and on two empirical
networks, a social / contact network in an Indian village and an online social network in
the U.S. Our goal is to learn simultaneously about the spreading process parameters and
the source node (first infected node) of the epidemic, given a fixed and known network
structure, and observations about state of nodes at several points in time. Our inference
scheme is based on approximate Bayesian computation (ABC), an inference technique for
complex models with likelihood functions that are either expensive to evaluate or analyt-
ically intractable. ABC enables us to adopt a Bayesian approach to the problem despite
the posterior distribution being very complex. Our method is agnostic about the topology
of the network and the nature of the spreading process. It generally performs well and,
somewhat counter-intuitively, the inference problem appears to be easier on more hetero-
geneous network topologies, which enhances its future applicability to real-world settings
where few networks have homogeneous topologies.
Keywords: Network, Spreading Process, Epidemics, Bayesian Inference, Approximate Bayesian
Computation
∗The networks and the codes used to simulate the spreading processes and to infer the spread-
ing process parameters and seed-node from the simulated epidemics can be downloaded from:
https://github.com/eth-cscs/abcpy-models/tree/master/Network/SpreadingProcessNetwork.
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1 Introduction
Human susceptibility to epidemics of misinformation and disease has grown manyfold as
the world we inhabit keeps getting smaller due to increased access to online information
and soaring global mobility [1]. Social media platforms have changed the way we consume
information [2], and more and more people find their news through social media [3]. Fol-
lowing the 2016 presidential election in the United States, there have been investigations
into the spread of false stories, or “fake news” on social media, and based on web browsing
data, archives of fact-checking websites, and results from an online survey, a recent study
found that social media were an important source of election news [4].
While ascertainment of social network structures is generally difficult using traditional
survey-based approaches, such as name generators, which are survey questions designed
to solicit information about friends and acquaintances of a subject, online platforms read-
ily capture the structure of large-scale social networks, therefore making them well suited
to study spread of information whether accurate or not. Further, although the transmis-
sion mechanisms are very different, the spread of information in online systems has many
similarities to the spread of infectious diseases among hosts in a population. From a mathe-
matical and statistical point of view, one can therefore investigate the spread of pathogens
and the spread of information in the same framework as long as the network structure
accurately captures the transmission pathways and the spreading process is parametrized
appropriately.
In this paper, we consider a simple susceptible-infected (SI) process and a more complex
spreading process on a fixed and known network structure. This spreading process may be
conceptualized as propagating either a pathogen or a piece of information. We focus on
addressing two distinct questions that are relevant in both settings: (1) How to infer the
unknown parameters associated with the spreading process? and (2) How to identify the
source node that most likely was responsible for introducing the pathogen or information
into the network? To address these questions, we assume that the system evolves in discrete
time steps, and we observe the state of all nodes at each time steps in the course of the
epidemic from time t0 (first observation) to time T (last observation). We further assume
that the spreading process is parametrized by θ and the epidemic starts from a single
node, which we call the seed node, denoted by nSN. Our goal is to perform inference
jointly on θ and nSN given the observed data. Because the spreading process operates on a
network, the likelihood function for the data is not analytically available, and we therefore
use approximate Bayesian computation (ABC) to simulate samples from the approximate
posterior distribution of (θ, nSN) given the observed data.
Bayesian inference of spreading process parameters is a well developed research area
[5, 6, 7, 8, 9], where ABC has been used to infer parameters of spreading processes in
recent past [10, 11, 12, 13]. To our knowledge, for a spreading process propagated on
a network, Bayesian inference has only been used to infer parameters of a susceptible-
infected-recovered (SIR) epidemic model on a Bernoulli random graph [14, 15, 13]. This
is the first attempt to extend the Bayesian framework to different spreading processes on
different network topologies, whereas we acknowledge that inference of parameters for SIR
process is harder than for SI process (being a special case of SIR) and equally, if not less
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difficult than for complex contagion process, considered in this manuscript. Separate from
this line of research, the estimation of the seed-node, learning which nodes were infected at
a fixed time point, has been studied in [16, 17, 18]. Here, we give a framework where we can
simultaneously estimate the spreading process parameters and the seed-node, which can
be applied to any contagion process and any general network topology. To illustrate the
generality of our method in Section 5, we compare the performance of suggested Bayesian
parameter estimates with the Netsleuth algorithm [19] for seed-node detection.
We study this problem on synthetic network topologies generated by the Baraba´si-
Albert (BA) and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) models. Finally, to investigate the performance of our
inference scheme on empirical networks, we consider the simulated spread of a pathogen
among the inhabitants of a rural Indian village and the simulated spread of information
among a group of Facebook users. Because of the differences in spreading dynamics, we use
two similar but distinct spreading processes, simple and complex. As the results demon-
strate, our general inference framework performs reasonably well across a range of network
topologies, whether synthetic or empirical, and for both types of spreading processes (sim-
ple and complex).
2 Spreading processes
2.1 Simple contagion
For modeling the spread of infections on a human contact network, we consider a simple
spreading process, i.e., the standard susceptible-infected (SI) process on a fixed network.
In this model, there are only two states, susceptible and infected, and this process is
suitable for modeling the spread of pathogens in contact networks because a single successful
exposure can be sufficient for transmission. In our specification of the process with unit
infectivity [20, 21], at each time step, each infected node chooses one of its neighbors
with equal probability regardless of their status (susceptible or infected), and if the chosen
node is susceptible, it is infected with probability θ. We denote this model by MS and
parametrize it in terms of the spreading rate θ and of the seed node nSN. For given values
of these two parameters, nSN = n
∗
SN and θ = θ
∗, we can forward simulate the evolving
epidemic over time using the MS model as
MS[n
∗
SN
, θ∗]→ {NI(t), t = 0, 1, . . . , T}, (1)
where NI(t) is a list of infected nodes at time t.
2.2 Complex contagion
Our complex spreading process incorporates the idea that social, unlike biological conta-
gion, may require multiple exposures, possibly from multiple hosts, to render a susceptible
person infected, where, in this context, an infected person refers to someone who has
adopted the circulating piece of information and can spread it among his or her contacts.
Non-probabilistic threshold models for complex contagion have a long history [22], and
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they have been applied to datasets capturing the spread of moods, ideas and news on so-
cial networks [23, 24, 25] and their theoretical properties are well known [26, 27, 28]. A
stochastic version of this threshold-based complex contagion process was recently devel-
oped in [24], and it was shown to perform well in modeling a large Twitter dataset. This
model has three states: susceptible (S), exposed (E), and infected (I), where a susceptible
person (S) has not been exposed to the piece of information, the exposed person (E) has
been exposed to the information but is not yet infectious, and finally the infected person
(I) is able to spread the information further. Hence, the complex spreading process consists
of two sub-processes: transition of a susceptible person to an exposed one and transition
of an exposed person to an infected one.
As our goal here is not to find the best model suitable for a specific dataset, but rather
to illustrate the properties of our inferential framework, we introduce some modifications to
the model of [24]. Our model corresponds to the model of [24] as far as becoming infected
(E to I transition) is concerned, but to model the exposure (S to E transition), we use the
SI process with unit infectivity. The process of how a person becomes exposed is likely to
vary across settings, but we absorb these multiple factors in a single probability, over a time
window (e.g., a single day), and we use this as the basis of our exposure mechanism. More
specifically, we use a Bernoulli random variable parametrized by the rate of exposure β to
model the process by which a susceptible neighbor of an infected node becomes exposed.
In this complex spreading process, the transition of an exposed person to an infected
one depends both on how many times she has been exposed to the information and how
many of her friends (neighboring nodes) are infected. To keep track of exposures, we define
a collection of exposure summaries L(t) for all nodes, where the exposure summary for node
i at time t, denoted by Li(t), has length equal to the number of infected neighbors of node
i. The first element of Li(t), that we denote by Li,1(t), counts the number of exposures
node i experienced when it had a single infected neighbor, and, in general, the kth element,
denoted by Li,k(t), counts the number of exposures the node experienced when it had k
infected neighbors. The length of these summary statistics generally increases with time.
For example, let us consider the following summary list for node i at time t = 4:
Li(4) = (3, 5).
Here the first element, Li,1(4) = 3, indicates that the node had 3 exposures when it had a
single infected neighbor, and the second element, Li,2(4) = 5, indicates that the node had
5 exposures when it had 2 infected neighbors. Let |Li(t)| denote the length of the vector
Li(t) which corresponds to the number of infected neighbors node i has by time t. In the
example above |Li(4)|= 2 meaning that, at time t = 4 node i had 2 infected neighbors.
The probability for node i to become infected precisely at the very last exposure in the
vector of exposures captured in Li(t) is given by


|Li(t)|−1∏
k=1
(1− pk)
Li,k(t)

 (1− p|Li(t)|)Li,|Li(t)|(t)−1p|Li(t)|
where pk is the probability of infection when a node has k infected neighbors. To approxi-
mate the threshold-like behavior of the non-probabilistic complex contagion model of [28],
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pk is modeled as a modified logistic sigmoid function:
pk = ǫlow +
ǫhigh − ǫlow
1 + exp (−g(k − γFi))
where k > 0 and Fi is the degree of node i, i.e., the number of neighbors of i. We note
that pk is an increasing function of k. The minimum and maximum values of pk (ǫhigh
and ǫlow), for all k ≥ 1 are fixed to 0.001 and 0.25, respectively, and the shape parameter
is g = 1. The threshold parameter γ shifts the location of the threshold in the sigmoid
function, approximating the effect of the relative threshold in the non-probabilistic complex
contagion model. In a non-probabilistic complex contagion model, an exposed person could
be infected only after a fraction γ of the neighboring nodes has already been infected.
Similarly, here the probability of infection pk is significantly higher when k > γFi i.e. if a
fraction greater than γ of neighboring nodes are infected.
To initiate the spreading process from a given seed node nSN = n
∗
SN
, we infect a propor-
tion of its neighbors (following [26] we take this proportion to be γ) and these infected nodes
constitute the first wave of the infection; the contagion is thereafter propagated throughout
the network until all nodes are infected. (More precisely, when nSN = n
∗
SN
, we first round
the product γFn∗
SN
to the nearest integer, choose this number of nodes at random from
among the neighbors of node n∗
SN
, and then deterministically infect all of these nodes.) The
complex contagion model, denoted byMC , is parametrized in terms of the rate of exposure
β and threshold γ, collectively denoted by θ = (β, γ). Given the model MC and values of
nSN = n
∗
SN
and θ = θ∗, we can forward simulate the spreading process as
MC [n
∗
SN
, θ∗]→ {(NI(t),NE(t),L(t)) , t = 0, 1, . . . , T} , (2)
where the model generates the output lists NI(t), NE(t) and L(t), which correspond to the
infected and exposed nodes in the network, plus a collection of exposure summaries for all
nodes i ∈ NE(t) at time t.
3 Data generation
3.1 Simulating observed data
We use the term observed data, denoted by x0, to refer to a dataset generated by some
real-world process, and our goal is to learn about parameter values characterizing this
process. In this paper, for illustrative purposes, we generate the observed datasets using
the models described above. If we assume that the first observation of the process occurs
at time t0 and the last observation at time T , then the observed dataset for the simple
contagion model is x0 ≡ {N0
I
(t) : t = t0, t0+1, . . . , T} and for the complex contagion model
x0 ≡ {(N0
I
(t),N0
E
(t),L0(t)) : t = t0, t0 + 1, . . . , T}. Given x0 and the fixed structure of the
underlying network, the goal is to estimate the model parameters and the identity of the
source-node. To this aim, we develop below an approximate Bayesian inference scheme that
allows us to quantify the uncertainty in the inferred model parameters, uncertainty which
is inherent to the inferential process given the stochastic nature of the models described in
Equations 1 & 2.
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3.2 Synthetic networks
The topology of social and contact networks can be significantly different and epidemic
spreading processes are usually sensitive to the topology of the network. To study our
inference scheme on different types of networks, we generated synthetic networks using the
Baraba´si-Albert (BA) [29] and the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) [30] models, where in each case the
networks have 100 nodes. The difficulty of inference is affected by the number of infected
nodes at different times, which depends on several factors, such as network structure,
network size, spreading process (including its parameters). To make the problem more
computationally tractable, we study the inference scheme in details on synthetic networks
of relatively small size (100 nodes) and larger empirical networks. The BA model is char-
acterized by two parameters, one of which is network size, and we set the other parameter
m = 4, which specifies that each new node gives rise to m = 4 edges in the network. The
network is grown from a small seed network by the addition of nodes, one at a time, and the
edges are inserted using proportional preferential attachment, meaning they are connected
to existing nodes with a probability that is proportional to the degree of already existing
nodes [31]. The ER model is likewise characterized by two parameters, one of which is also
network size, and we set the other parameter p = 0.05, which specifies the probability that
any two nodes are connected with an edge, i.e., each dyad (pair of nodes) is associated
with an IID Bernoulli random variable. We considered both simple and complex contagion
processes on networks generated from these models with the following details:
Simple contagion
A simple contagion epidemic is simulated on the BA and ER networks starting from a
seed node n0
SN
that is chosen uniformly at random over all network nodes and the common
diffusion rate is set to θ0 = 0.3. The observed dataset x0 is constructed from the simulated
dataset by setting t0 = 20 and T = 70.
Complex contagion
For the simulation of complex contagion epidemics, the values of the parameters are fixed at
θ0 ≡ (β0, γ0) = (0.7, 0.3). For each simulation round, we use the same network realization
that was generated for the simple contagion and we also start the epidemic from the same
seed node used in the simple contagion. The observed dataset x0 is constructed by setting
t0 = 20 and T = 120.
3.3 Empirical networks
We also consider two empirical networks, a human social / contact network constructed
among 354 inhabitants of a village of South Indian state of Karnataka [32] and a social
network among 4039 Facebook users [33].
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Simple contagion of disease in an Indian village
We consider a simple contagion model to simulate an epidemic of a disease in the Indian
village contact network. The network has 354 nodes and 1541 edges, representing 354
villagers and reported contacts and social relationships among them. The epidemic is
simulated using θ0 = 0.3, n0SN = 70, and the observed dataset x
0 is the infected nodes NI(t)
for t = t0, t0 + 1, . . . , T with t0 = 20 and T = 70.
Complex contagion of information on Facebook
To simulate an epidemic of information on a Facebook network, we use the complex con-
tagion model. The network has 4039 nodes and 88234 edges; other topological features of
the network can be found in [33]. For the complex contagion model, we fix the parameter
values as θ0 ≡ (β0, γ0) = (0.7, 0.3), n0SN = 2000, and the observed dataset x
0 is the infected
nodes NI(t), exposed nodes NE(t), and a collection of exposure summaries for all exposed
nodes L(t) at time t = t0, t0 + 1, . . . , T , when t0 = 20 and T = 120.
For the sake of completeness, we also consider the complex and simple contagion process
on Indian village contact network and Facebook network respectively starting at n0
SN
=
70 and n0SN = 2000. The epidemics are simulated in these cases using the same values
for the other parameters used to simulate the complex and simple contagion processes
correspondingly on Facebook and Indian village contact network above.
4 Inference framework
4.1 Bayesian inference
We can quantify the uncertainty of the inferred parameter φ = (θ, nSN) by their posterior
density p(φ|x) given the observed dataset x = x0. The posterior density can be written
by Bayes’ theorem as,
p(φ|x) =
π(φ)p(x|φ)
m(x)
, (3)
where π(φ), p(x|φ) andm(x) =
∫
π(φ)p(x|φ)dφ are, correspondingly, the prior density on
the parameter φ, the likelihood function, and the marginal likelihood. The prior density
π(φ) enables a way to leverage the learning of parameters from prior knowledge, which
is expected to be available especially for infectious diseases. If the likelihood function
can be evaluated, at least up to a normalizing constant, then the posterior density can be
approximated by drawing a sample of parameter values from it using (Markov chain) Monte
Carlo sampling schemes [34]. The likelihood function induced by our model of network
epidemics is too demanding computationally to evaluate due to the complex stochastic
nature of the models.
In this setting, approximate Bayesian computation (ABC) [35] offers a way to sample
from the approximate posterior density and opens up the possibility of sound statistical
inference on the parameter φ.
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4.2 Approximate Bayesian computation (ABC)
Models that are easy to forward simulate, given values of the parameters, are called
simulator-based models in the ABC literature1 and they are used in a wide range of scientific
disciplines to describe and understand different aspects of nature ranging from dynamics
of sub-atomic particles [36] to evolution of human societies [37] and formation of universes
[38]. In the fundamental rejection ABC sampling scheme, we simulate a synthetic dataset
xsim from the simulator-based modelM(φ) for a fixed parameter value of φ and measure
the closeness between xsim and x0 using a pre-defined discrepancy measure d(xsim,x0).
Based on this discrepancy measure, ABC accepts the parameter value φ when d(xsim,x0)
is less than a pre-specified threshold value ǫ.
The intractable likelihood L(φ) is approximated by Ld,ǫ(φ) for some ǫ > 0, where
Ld,ǫ(φ) ∝ P (d(x
sim,x0) < ǫ) (4)
and, as a consequence, the sampled parameters follow the posterior distribution of φ con-
ditional on d(xsim,x0) < ǫ:
pd,ǫ(φ|x
0) ∝ P (d(xsim,x0) < ǫ)π(φ). (5)
For a better approximation of the likelihood function, computationally efficient sequential
ABC algorithms [39] decrease the value of the threshold ǫ adaptively while exploring the
parameter space. Here, we use simulated annealing approximate Bayesian computation
(SABC) [40] implemented in our ABCpy Python package [41] for optimal utilization of an
HPC environment. Using SABC, we can draw samples from pd,ǫ(φ|x0) [Equation 5], for
a very small value of ǫ such that the distribution numerically converges to the posterior
distribution p(φ|x0). All the tuning parameters for the SABC algorithm are fixed at the
default values in the ABCpy package with the exception of the number of steps and the
acceptance rate cutoff, which were set to 200 and 0.0001, respectively. We define below
the summary statistics extracted from the dataset, the discrepancy measure used, the prior
distribution of parameters, and the perturbation kernel to explore the parameter space in
the SABC algorithm.
Generally for ABC, the crucial aspect for a good approximation to the likelihood func-
tion is the choice of the summary statistics, as we define the discrepancy measure between
xsim and x0 through a distance between the extracted summary statistics from xsim and
x0. When choosing the summary statistics, one faces a trade-off between minimizing the
loss of information on φ contained in the data and picking low-dimensional summaries to
avoid curse of dimensionality [42]. Here we use intuitive discrepancy measures between
interpretable summary statistics (e.g., the Euclidean distance between the proportion of
infected nodes at different time-steps for estimation of θ) additional to domain-driven dis-
crepancy measures (e.g., the shortest path length distance between the subgraphs induced
1In this manuscript, we will use the term simulator-based model to refer to a model that enables direct
simulation of model outcomes using a set of stochastic rules. This term is well established within the ABC
literature, but we point out that these types of models are sometimes called mechanistic models or agent
based models in different fields of science.
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by the infected nodes, at each time step). Subjectivity of these decisions can be removed
through automatic summary selection for ABC, described in [42], [43], [44] and [45], where
an informative linear or non-linear combination of the summaries is chosen. To keep our
summary statistics interpretable, we stick to the intuitive and domain-driven summary
statistics and discrepancy measures described next.
Summary statistics
Given a dataset x ≡ {NI(t) : t = t0, t0 + 1, . . . , T} for the simple contagion model or a
dataset x ≡ {NI(t),NE(t),L(t) : t = t0, t0 + 1, . . . , T} for the complex contagion model, we
compute an array of summary statistics,
Simple contagion, FS : x→ (I)
Complex contagion, FC : x→ (I,E, fe)
defined as follows:
• I = (It0 , It0+1, . . . , IT ): It is the subgraph induced by the infected nodes, at each time
t.
• E = (Et0 , Et0+1, . . . , ET ): Et is the subgraph induced by the exposed nodes, at each
time t.
• fe = (fet0 , fet0+1, . . . , feT ): fet is the proportions of the nodes exposed for the first
time, at each time t.
We note that the summary statistics chosen here are high dimensional, but they are
also highly dependent on each other. The subgraphs induced by infected or exposed nodes
at time ti contain the subgraphs induced at the previous time step ti−1, but the subgraphs
at both the time points are needed to capture information about the evolution of these
subgraphs. Similarly the vector containing the proportions of first time exposed nodes,
at each time step, is also an increasing sequence of real numbers. This high dependence
between the summary statistics reduces their effective dimension. This intuitively explains
why the inference scheme does not suffer from the curse of dimensionality, despite having
a large number of summary statistics.
Discrepancy measure
The discrepancy measure between two datasets x(1) and x(2) is constructed by considering
the following two distance functions between the summary statistics extracted from them.
Simple contagion:
dS(x
(1),x(2)) := d
(
FS(x
(1)),FS(x
(2))
)
= dN
(
I(1), I(2)
)
Complex contagion:
dC(x
(1),x(2)) := d
(
FC(x
(1)),FC(x
(2))
)
= dN
(
I(1), I(2)
)
+ dN
(
E(1),E(2)
)
+ dE
(
fe(1), fe(2)
)
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Here dE is the Euclidean distance,
dN
(
S(1),S(2)
)
=dE
(
V
(
S(1)
)
, V
(
S(2)
))
+


1
T−t0
T∑
t=t0
1
c(t)
∑
i∈S
(1)
t \S
(2)
t
∑
j∈S
(2)
t \S
(1)
t
ρ(i,j)
ρmax
, if S(1) 6⊂ S(2) or S(2) 6⊂ S(1)
1, otherwise
V (S) = [|St0 | , |St0+1| , . . . , |ST |] /|N |, |N | is the number of nodes on network N , c(t) =
max
(
1,
∣∣∣S(1)t \ S(2)t
∣∣∣
)
× max
(
1,
∣∣∣S(2)t \ S(1)t
∣∣∣
)
, ρ(i, j) is the shortest path length between
nodes i and j on the network N and ρmax is the maximum shortest path length between
any two nodes in the network N , i.e., the network diameter. The motivation for these
discrepancy measure is to simultaneously capture differences in the proportions of the
nodes in different epidemic states as well as differences in their locations on the network.
Prior
We use independent prior distributions on θ, β, γ and nSN:
• Prior on nSN: Discrete uniform distribution on the infected nodes of the network at
t0.
• Prior on θ, β and γ: Continuous uniform distribution on [0, 1].
Perturbation kernel
A perturbation kernel used to explore the parameter space is defined as a distribution on
φ conditional on the present parameter values φ∗.
Simple contagion:
KS (φ|φ
∗) = K1S(θ|θ
∗, σˆ)K2(nSN|n
∗
SN
)
Complex contagion:
KC (φ|φ
∗) = K1C(θ|θ
∗, Σˆ)K2(nSN|n
∗
SN
)
Here K1S and K1C are univariate and multivariate Gaussian distributions with σˆ and
Σˆ, respectively being the estimated variance of θ and the variance-covariance matrix of
θ, sampled in the previous updating step of SABC. K2 is a discrete distribution on the
neighboring nodes of n∗SN with each node having a probability inversely proportional to its
degree, which makes an uniform exploration of the network nodes possible irrespective of
the heterogeneity present in the network.
4.3 Parameter estimation
Given an epidemic on a network, our main goal is to estimate φ given x0. In decision
theory, the Bayes estimator minimizes posterior expected loss, Ep(φ|x0)(L(φ, ·)|x
0), with
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the following loss functions.
Simple contagion:
L(φ1,φ2) := dE(θ1, θ2) + ρ(nSN1, nSN2)
Complex contagion:
L(φ1,φ2) := dE(θ1, θ2) + ρ(nSN1, nSN2)
If we have Z IID samples (φi)
Z
i=1 from the posterior distribution p(φ|x
0), the Bayes esti-
mator can be approximated as
φˆ = argmin
φ
1
Z
Z∑
i=1
L(φi,φ). (6)
5 Results
5.1 Inference on synthetic networks
1000 IID samples were drawn from the posterior distribution of φ, p(φ|x0), using SABC
inference scheme. The inferred marginal posterior distribution of θ and nSN on the BA and
ER networks are shown in Figure 1 for the simple and complex contagion processes. We
recover the true values of the spreading parameter θ0 (dashed vertical line), which has a
high posterior probability (left panels). The posterior distribution of the seed-node (right
panels) is also concentrated in the network neighborhood of n0SN.
Bayes estimates
As the contagion models are stochastic, x0 generated from contagion model with the same
values of φ0 will also be a random quantity. Hence φˆ = (θˆ, nˆSN), being a function of the
observed dataset x0, is also random. To quantify the randomness of the Bayes estimator,
we generated 100 observed datasets as before, using both simple and complex contagion, on
the BA and ER networks for the same parameter values. We infer the posterior distribution
and the Bayes estimate using Equation 6 for each dataset.
The marginal density of the estimated parameters from 100 different realizations of x0
of simple and complex contagion model on BA and ER networks are shown in Figure 2.
We note that the density of nˆSN peaks at n
0
SN
, the true source node, with a significant
concentration on the nodes that are at path lengths ≤ 2 from n0
SN
. Similarly, the estimates
of the parameters of the spreading processes are concentrated in a neighborhood of the true
value, showing the robustness of the parameter estimation scheme for different epidemic
models and different synthetic network topologies.
Sensitivity of inference to the number of observations
In the cases considered x0 contained ∆T = 50 and ∆T = 100 observed time steps for
simple and complex contagion models, respectively, where ∆T = T − t0. Next, we explored
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Figure 1: Inference of simple and complex contagion models. Density of the inferred
marginal posterior distribution of parameters of the spreading process and nSN, given x
0, for
epidemics on Baraba´si-Albert (BA) and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) networks. The leftmost panels
(a,d,g,j) describe properties of the spreading process whereas the middle and rightmost pan-
els (b,e,h,k,c,f,i,l) deal with seed-node identification. For the simple contagion, we show the
marginal posterior distribution of θ in panels a and d, where the true values are θ0 = 0.3. The
corresponding plots for complex contagion are shown in panels g and j, the distribution of θ,
where the true values are θ0 ≡ (β0, γ0) = (0.7, 0.3). Panels b,e and c,f display, respectively, the
marginal posterior distribution and maximum posterior distribution on a single node at different
distances from the true seed-node n0SN for simple contagion model, while the corresponding plots
for complex contagion process are in panels h,k and i,l. The density for θ and θ were computed
using Gaussian kernel density estimation on the samples from the posterior distribution [46].
Panels (a,b,c,g,h,i) refer to BA; (d,e,f,j,k,l) refer to ER. The diameters of the simulated BA
and ER networks are, respectively, 4 and 6.
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Figure 2: Parameter estimates of simple and complex contagion models. For the simple
contagion model, we display the marginal densities of θˆ and marginal density of nˆSN at different
distances from the true seed-node n0SN, estimated from 100 observed datasets x
0 on the BA (panels
a,b) and ER networks (panels c,d). For the complex contagion model, the corresponding results
are shown for the BA model (panels e,f) and the ER model (panels g,h). To estimate the densities
of θˆ and θˆ, we used Gaussian kernel density estimation with band-width 0.6. The diameters of
the simulated BA and ER networks are, respectively, 4 and 6.
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how different values of ∆T influence the accuracy of inference. Inference of the seed-node
only depends on the states of the nodes of the network observed at t = t0 and is unaffected
by the observations at subsequent time steps. For the sensitivity study, we therefore only
consider inference of the remaining model parameters. In Figure 3, we show the inferred
marginal posterior distribution of model parameters (θ and θ respectively for simple and
complex contagion) when considering only the first ∆T time steps of the observed dataset
for different values of ∆T . The posterior distribution is concentrated in a neighborhood of
the true value for all values of ∆T , though we notice, as expected, that the concentration
of the posterior distribution around the true value increases with the observed number of
time steps (∆T ). We conclude that our inference scheme can perform well also with a small
number of observed time steps (∆T ), though the performance improves with the increase
of ∆T , which is intuitive as each observed time step carries additional information on the
unknown value of the model parameter that has generated the observed dataset x0.
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Figure 3: Dependence of inference on ∆T = T−t0. Density of the inferred marginal posterior
distribution of θ and θ, given ∆T = T − t0 observed time steps in x
0 starting at t0 = 20, the
simple (panels a, b) and complex (panels c, d) contagion process simulated on the Barbasi-Albert
(BA) and Erdo¨s-Re`nyi (ER) networks correspondingly. (a,c): BA; (b,d):ER. The diameters of
the simulated BA and ER networks are, respectively, 4 and 6.
Comparison with the Netsleuth algorithm
One of the outcomes of the suggested parameter estimation scheme is the estimation of
a seed-node, which has recently received attention in modeling the spread of disease or
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information on social networks [16, 17, 18]. As the likelihood function for the source node
initiating a general spreading process on a general network topology is intractable, existing
research on source node detection assumes a specific contagion process and a fixed network
topology, typically a tree. Under these assumptions, one estimates the source node by
maximizing an approximate likelihood function and then proposes a heuristic algorithm for
doing inference on a general network topology by assuming the approximation to hold more
generally. In the spirit of indirect inference [47] we could use the estimates of the seed-node
and contagion probability from these simple models available in the literature as summary
statistics in our ABC framework. Note that, crucially, to this aim there is no need for
a closed form expression of the likelihood of these simple models unlike what is typically
advocated for indirect inference, see for example in [48]. The different contributions in
this literature vary depending on what type of spreading process is assumed to operate
on the network. Processes that have been studied up to date include the independent
cascade model [16], the susceptible-infected (SI) process [17, 49, 18, 50, 19, 51] which
coincides with our simple contagion process, the susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) [52],
the heterogeneous SIR [53] where the approximate likelihood has been demonstrated to be
asymptotically valid in geometric trees [17], and spreading processes on infinite trees [52].
All approaches we are aware of use spreading process specific approximations of the likelihood
function and apply them to specific network topologies. In contrast, in our approach the
implicit approximation of the likelihood function does not depend on the specific spreading
process or the specific network topology under consideration, but it does however depend
on the choice of the ABC discrepancy measure between the observed and simulated data.
We have given an intuitive justification behind the choice of the discrepancy measure in
Section 4.
In Figure 4, we compare our Bayes estimate of seed-node with estimates computed by
the Netsleuth algorithm of [18, 19] for 100 different simple contagion process datasets. To
find the estimate of the seed-node, the Netsleuth algorithm maximizes an approximate
likelihood function under the assumption of a regular tree network topology for SI process.
As the inference of the seed-node only depends on the observations at t = t0, to infer the
seed-node using the Netsleuth algorithm, we use the state of the nodes at t0 with the true
value of θ assumed to be known. Our simulation shows that similar to our methodology,
the Netsleuth algorithm also performs better on more heterogeneous network topologies.
However, the Bayes estimate is superior in detecting the true seed-node. We also note that
the proposed Bayesian scheme is able to quantify uncertainty of the seed-node, while the
Netsleuth algorithm only provides a point estimate.
The proposed method is substantially more expensive than the Netsleuth algorithm.
NetSleuth algorithm and the method we propose, take respectively 0.002 (on a single core)
and 391 seconds (using 30 nodes with 36 cores of Piz Daint Cray architecture (Intel Broad-
well + NVidia TESLA P100)), to infer the seed-node of an epidemic on simulated BA
network with 100 nodes. The most expensive step of Netsleuth algorithm is an eigen-
value decomposition, whereas SABC inference scheme depends on repeated simulations of
datasets for different parameter values, making it computationally expensive. The reported
inference results have been achieved by using the efficient HPC architecture developed in
[41].
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Figure 4: Bayes and Netsleuth estimates of seed-node for simple contagion model. For
the simple contagion model, we display the marginal density of nˆSN at different distances from
the true seed-node n0SN, estimated from 100 observed datasets x
0 using proposed Bayesian scheme
(panels a,c) and Netsleuth (panels b,d). (a,b): BA; (c,d):ER. The diameters of the simulated
BA and ER networks are, respectively, 4 and 6.
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5.2 Inference on empirical networks
We next turn to inference of the posterior distribution of φ ≡ (θ, nSN) for epidemics on em-
pirical networks. The marginal posterior distributions and the Bayes estimates of (θ, nSN)
are show in Figures 5, 6, 8 & 7. The inferred posterior distributions for the simple and
complex contagion epidemics, both on the Indian village contact network and Facebook
social network, is concentrated around the true parameter values. The Bayes estimates are
also in a very small neighborhood of the true value, specifically the estimated seed-node
(nˆSN) has a shortest path distance less than or equal to 1 from n
0
SN
in all the cases. These
two real networks have high average clustering coefficients (Indian village contact network:
0.642, Facebook social network: 0.605), compared to the average clustering coefficients of
the simulated networks considered before (BA network: 0.161, ER network: 0.091). Our re-
sults thus demonstrate that the inference scheme can also be successfully applied to highly
clustered networks.
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Figure 5: Simple contagion model on Indian village contact network. Panel a shows
the density of the inferred marginal posterior distribution and Bayes estimate of θ, given x0,
the epidemics on the Indian village contact network. Panel b and c correspondingly display the
marginal posterior distribution and maximum posterior distribution on a single node at different
distances from the true seed-node n0SN. The shortest path length distance between n
0
SN and nˆSN is
1. The diameter of the component, containing n0SN, of Indian village contact network is 7.
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Figure 6: Complex contagion model on Facebook Social Network. Panel a shows the
density of the inferred marginal posterior distribution and Bayes estimate of θ, given x0, the
epidemics on the Facebook social network. Panel b and c correspondingly display the marginal
posterior distribution and maximum posterior distribution on a single node at different distances
from the true seed-node n0SN. The shortest path length distance between n
0
SN and nˆSN is 1. The
diameter of the Facebook Social Network is 8.
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Figure 7: Simple contagion model on Facebook Social Network. Panel a shows the density
of the inferred marginal posterior distribution and Bayes estimate of θ, given x0, the epidemics
on the Facebook social network. Panel b and c correspondingly display the marginal posterior
distribution and maximum posterior distribution on a single node at different distances from the
true seed-node n0SN. The shortest path length distance between n
0
SN and nˆSN is 1. The diameter
of the Facebook Social Network is 8.
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Figure 8: Complex contagion model on Indian village contact network. Panel a shows
the density of the inferred marginal posterior distribution and Bayes estimate of θ, given x0,
the epidemics on the Indian village contact network. Panel b and c correspondingly display the
marginal posterior distribution and maximum posterior distribution on a single node at different
distances from the true seed-node n0SN. The shortest path length distance between n
0
SN and nˆSN is
0. The diameter of the component, containing n0SN, of Indian village contact network is 7.
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Discussion
We have introduced a likelihood-free Bayesian inference scheme for studying spreading
processes on networks. The framework is able to estimate jointly the parameters of the
spreading process and the identity of the seed-node, and it is also able to quantify the asso-
ciated uncertainty. We show that our inferential framework is robust to different network
topologies, contagion processes and length of the observation period (number of observa-
tions). Both in the synthetic and the empirical applications, the Bayes estimators of the
parameters and the seed-nodes are concentrated around their respective true values. In
general, we find that performing inference on spreading process parameters is considerably
easier than performing inference on the seed-nodes, as the variance of the marginal pos-
terior density of spreading process parameters are smaller than the one of the seed-node,
while we use uniform prior density for both of them. This is intuitive since inference on the
infection seed-nodes only makes use of the observations in a single time step (the first one
in a sequence of many), whereas inference on spreading process parameters can leverage
information present in the entire sequence of observations. This asymmetry might also be
due to the choice of the summary statistics and the distance measure, which may contain
more information on the spreading process parameters. We also find that inference is gen-
erally more difficult on more homogeneous networks, whether model generated (synthetic)
or empirical. On synthetic networks, our inference scheme was more accurate for spreading
processes propagating on a Baraba´si-Albert network with a fat-tailed power-law degree
distribution than an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network with a more concentrated Poisson degree dis-
tribution. Similarly, our framework performed better on the empirical Facebook network
than the Indian village network, where the latter has a more homogeneous degree distribu-
tion due to the use of name generators in network ascertainment, which impose an upper
bound on the number of acquaintances that may be nominated [54], which has been shown
to affect the speed and size of epidemics simulated on such networks [55]. The flexibility
of our method allows for many generalizations. For example, one could incorporate nodal
covariates in the spreading process to account for different levels of epidemic risk and social
influence. The most important limitation of our approach is the assumption of observing
all infected persons at all time steps, as well as the assumption that the network structure
is fully known. Fortunately there is a large literature on Bayesian methods on missing data,
and incorporating some of these approaches in our inference scheme is a promising direction
for future research in this area. Given the generality of the Bayesian inference scheme, the
methodology presented here can be extended to situations where we have more than one
seed-node [18], we have only noisy/partial observations [51] at fixed time points, or when
the starting time of the spreading process is not known. Past research on seed-node in-
ference has assumed that the exact infection times and the transmission delays along each
edge of the network are known and are jointly distributed following a fixed parametric dis-
tribution [56, 57, 58]. Though in this manuscript we consider epidemics for which the state
of the nodes are observed at some discrete time points and threshold models [22, 26, 24]
which may not satisfy the assumption of fixed distribution for transmission delays along all
the edges. Our methodology can be also applied to the continuous time processes studied
in [56, 57, 58].
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